France's foreign policies reflects internal factors as well as external opportunites for market expansion, resources and prestige. And the perception of the interplay of these endogenous and exogenous circumstances by those French leaders who are authorized to speak in the name of France. Same situation for the United States. In an international system characterized by rivalry and division, when two countries seek markets (arms, nuclear reactors etc), prestige, limited resources such as oil in another weaker region, we necessarily have tensions. Some analysis below. (Also the brown hyperlinked words below correspond to reference and data links).
STRATEGIC AND HISTORIC CONSIDERATIONS
French foreign policy is founded on several centuries of diplomatic tradition and fundamental principles some of which are the right of peoples to self-determination, respect for human rights and democratic principles, respect for the rule of law, and cooperation among nations. (Ministere des Affaires Etrangères. France’s Foreign Policy. 27 Apr. 2007). The French constant notion that subsumes all of these elements is "mission civilisatrice" (a civilizing ethos to be spread in the world), which still has an entrenched place in French foreign policy. Gallis, Paul. “France: Factors Shaping Foreign Policy, and Issues in U.S.-French Relations.” CRS Report for Congress. 19 May 2006
Because of their unique, revolutionary histories, France and America both feel that they are the world’s sole guiding lights, on a crusade to spread a universal message of democracy, human rights, and social justice. However, as Dominique Moisi of France’s Institute for International Relations points out:
“While [the French] may feel that the competition for universalism is still going on, we also know that the Americans have already won the battle for power and language.” (Chesnoff, Richard Z. The Arrogance of the French. New York: Sentinel, 2005. page 8).
Since the Franco-Prussion war, France's influence in the world has been seriously wanning while America's power has been proportionately growing. Today, with fewer than 2,000 soldiers in the Middle East, and only two hundred under exclusive French control, France is in a far weaker position than the United States to achieve its own strategic goals. Moreover, France's own Muslim population is currently at 10%, and the Muslim electorate is growing fast ("sécurité sociale oblige"), like in Israel. Hence, France's pro Arab diplomatic position. As French historian and international expert Raymond Aron wrote about De Gaulle's pro Arab policy:
“(de Gaulle) is backing the Arabs, not because he is anti-Zionist or still less anti-Semitic, but in the interests of France.” (Aron, Raymond. De Gaulle, Israel and the Jews. London: Andre Deutsch, 1969. page 27)
THE FRANCO-AMERICAN SEEDS OF MIDDLE-EAST CONFLICTS: HISTORY AND THE FACTS
After France vetoed President Bush's attempts to get a UN Security Council resolution to invade Iraq, in a September 2003 column titled “Our War with France” Thomas Friedman, the foreign affairs columnist for the New York Times, concluded, “France wants America to fail in Iraq.” (Friedman, Thomas. “Our War with France.” New York Times 18 Sep. 2003) while President Bush condemned French fries and Congressman Bob Ney of Ohio, Chair of the Committee of House Administration at the time, renamed all French fries served in House cafeterias “Freedom fries,” calling the gesture a “small, but symbolic effort to show the strong displeasure of many on Capitol Hill with the actions of our so-called ally, France.” (Loughlin, Sean. “House cafeterias change names for ‘french’ fries and ‘french’ toast.” CNN.com 12 Mar. 2003.
It is this conflict over the competing French and American visions and interests in international relations in general and the Middle East in particular that has tensed Franco-American diplomatic relations. To better understand why France and the U.S. are often at loggerheads when it comes to foreign policy in general and the Mid-East in particular, we need to review the facts and some history.
SOME DISTANT HISTORY
France's relationship with the Mid East dates from the crusade era many centuries ago when organized expedition to Jerusalem. The Templiers front was eventually stifled by the French Royalty and the Church. The next major event was the invasion of the Maghreb and Spain by Islam. In 732, Charles Martel, King of the Franks, defeated the invading Muslim armies at the decisive Battle of Tours, halting the rapid Muslim conquest of territory that had begun with the Prophet Muhammad one hundred years earlier. A millennium later, French forces entered the Middle East when General Napoleon Bonaparte landed a large French expedition at Alexandria, Egypt in 1798,(around the "quasi naval war" with Jefferson) quickly conquering what is now Egypt, Israel, Palestine, and Syria before being defeated by the British (Nelson used "lemons" to beat navy "scurvy"). The French have had a permanent presence in the Middle East since the 1830 invasion and conquest of Algeria. With the establishment of protectorates Tunisia in 1881 and Morocco in 1911, the French Third Republic became the premier North African power. Following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I, France inherited the territories of Syria and Lebanon, establishing ties to the Levant that still exist today. However, with France dwindling power as a "great power", colonialist stress, Arab nationalism, and armed revolt, (i.e. the Algerian war was very costly, over one million dead), inter alia, the French totally freed their colonies, the last of which was Algeria in 1962 (Accords d'Evian, ending the Algerian war). However, to keep its influence and markets, France has continued to seek influence in the Middle East by favoring the causes of Arab countries on the international scene.
THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF LOCAL CONFLICTS VIA GREAT POWER RIVALRY AND THE "COLD WAR"
After gaining their independence, Arab states became new fronts in the Cold War. As the U.S. and U.S.S.R. rushed to supply the Third World with arms, local conflicts tended to get internationalized and French commercial and political interests necessarily were undermined. French Diplomacy had thus to to adjust its policies and start courting newly independent Arab states as equals. Tailoring his foreign policy accordingly, De Gaulle, from being pro Israeli (the French reactor Dimona was built by the French and the French, with the Russians were the ones to first protect the Jewish state at its beginning), balanced his country's foreign policy with Arab support. By the end of the Algeria War, France had reestablished full diplomatic ties with Algeria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iran, and Egypt, the Israeli Alliance had lost its importance. To mark this point, in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, France denied the United States refueling and over-flight rights for the resupply of arms and equipment to Israel.Stein, Kenneth. “Imperfect Alliances: Will Europe and America Ever Agree?” Middle East Quarterly 4.1 (Mar. 1997). 27 Apr. 2007
FRANCE SIDES WITH GROUPS THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT CALLED TERRORIST AND WARNS SADAM HUSSEIN OF AMERICAN WAR PREPARATIONS
Thus, to entrench French influence in the region, in 1974, President Valery Giscard d’Estaing established relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) despite its status at the zenith of international terror rankings, its recent involvement in the Munich Massacre of eleven Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympic Games, and its assassination of the U.S. Ambassador to Sudan in 1973. (Guitta, Olivier. “The Chirac Doctrine.” Middle East Quarterly 7.4 (Fall 2005): page 44). France also provided refuge for Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the future leader of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Following its courtship of the PLO and Khomeini, France became the leading supporter of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. In December 1974, then, Prime Minister Jacques Chirac visited Baghdad to negotiate trade agreements, including a deal for a nuclear reactor in eastern Iraq that was signed in September the following year. (Gouëset, Catherine. “France-Irak.” L’Express 27 Apr. 2007). When Saddam Hussein visited France to sign the accord, Chirac said, “I welcome you as my personal friend. I assure you my esteem, my consideration, and my affection.” (op. cit.,Guitta 47). Following the 1981 Israeli aerial bombing of the French-built nuclear reactor at Osirak, France even offered to rebuild the reactor (Ibid).
Between 1981 and 1996, Saddam Hussein spent more than $20 billion on French arms and aircraft, earning the French President the nickname of “Ch-iraq.” (Op. cit. Chesnoff, page 105). As the United States began marshalling international support for pre-emptive war against Baghdad, French politicians secretly met with Iraqi officials in May 2002 and “assured the Iraqis that France would use its veto in the United Nations Security Council against any American resolution to attack Iraq.”Central Intelligence Agency. “Regime Finance and Procurement,” Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD (Vol. 1) (30 Sep. 2004). 27 Apr. 2007.
After the U.S.-led invasion in March 2003, a dossier emerged indicating that French officials “kept Saddam abreast of every development in American planning and may have helped him to prepare for war. One report warned of an American attempt to associate Iraq with terrorism as “a cover for an attack on Iraq.”Campbell, Matthew. “Dossier Reveals France briefed Iraq on U.S. Plans.” The Sunday Times 27 Apr. 2003.
As for Hamas, in 2003, the Bush administration lodged complaints with Paris that it was doing little to counter the proliferation of Hamas front organizations in France. (Calabresi, Massimo, et al. “Hamas’ French Funds.” Time 22 Jun. 2003.). Despite the EU’s decision in late 2005 to designate Hamas as a terrorist group, France has refused to follow suit, allowing the non-military wings of Hamas to fundraise in France. (Levitt, Matthew. “U.S. Designated Hamas Front Gets Symbolic Win in France.” Policy Watch (Washington Institute for Near East Policy) 20 Mar. 2007: Page 1. A 2004). The French government position paper lauded Hamas’ “social activities which partially but significantly make up for some of the Palestinian Authority’s difficulties in guaranteeing essential services to Palestinian society,” without mentioning its involvement in suicidal terror and rocket attacks (Ibid). Following the formation of the Hamas-Fatah unity government in March 2007, France boasted that it was the first country to contact the new Palestinian government, despite the new government’s failure to adhere to the three principles for aid restoration agreed upon by the U.S., the U.N., the E.U., and Russia: renunciation of violence, recognition of Israel, and affirmation of past agreements. (Embassy of France in Washington. Standpoint 201 (23 Mar. 2007). 27 Apr. 2007).
On April 2, the French Foreign Minister Philippe Douste-Blazy (also an M.D. physician like Kouchner) suggested that the international community should gradually restore aid to the new Palestinian government (Associated Press. “France Says Aid Should be Progressively Restored to Palestinians, With Conditions.” 2 Apr. 2007). On the other hand, the United States agreed to maintain contacts only with non-Hamas members in order to continue funneling humanitarian aid directly to the Palestinian people.
CONVERGENCE OF INTERESTS AND PERCEPTIONS REGARDING POST 2004 EVENTS IN SYRIA AND LEBANON
In contrast to the tension over relations with the Palestinian Authority and elsewhere, the isolation and pressure against Syria marked a rare point of agreement between Paris and Washington. Syria was and still is viewed as an unstable and dangerous force in the region, causing French and American policies to converge even though French leaders once nurtured a close relationship with the former Syrian dictator Hafez al-Assad. In 2004, France and the United States cosponsored U.N. Security Council Resolution 1559, which called for the “withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, disbandment of remaining militias, most notably the armed wing of Hezbollah,and holding a Lebanese presidential election free from external pressure.” (Harris, William. “Bashar al-Assad’s Lebanon Gamble.” Middle East Quarterly 12.3 (Summer 2005). 27 Apr. 2007
When Syria failed to comply and continued to back pro-Damascus puppet and Lebanese President Emile Lehoud, it further angered both Chirac and Bush. Relations between Syria and the West plummeted in February 2005 after Rafik Hariri, a popular Lebanese former Prime Minister and Chirac confidant, was assassinated, allegedly with the consent of Damascus. According to one French diplomat, “Before, all we did for Syria was because of Hariri; now everything we do against Syria is because of Hariri, again.” (Guitta at 51). According to a report in the Jerusalem Post, at the start of the 2006 Second Lebanon War, Chirac told Israel that he would support an Israeli invasion of Syria to topple the Assad regime due to Damascus’ continued obstinacy in violating Lebanese territorial, political, and judicial integrity. “Report: France urged Israel to hit Syria.” Jerusalem Post (18 Mar. 2007), at 27 Apr. 2007.
Since then, both the United States and France have vigorously encouraged the development of a stable and democratic Lebanon. They have, however, and not un-surprisingly, disagreed about how to confront Hezbollah. After the U.S. labeled the Secretary-General of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah as the leader of a terrorist group, Chirac invited Nasrallah to a Beirut summit on Francophonie (Guitta, at 52). To this day, Paris still refuses to call Hezbollah a terrorist organization even though the European Union did so back in 2005. (Krasniqi, Ekrem. “EU lawmakers label Hizbollah ‘terrorist’ group.” ISN Security Watch (11 Mar. 2005). 27 Apr. 2007).
AT LOGGERHEADS WITH TURKEY
If the U.S. bans Hezbollah while France supports this group (to a limit, never recommeding outright terrorism and violence), the two countries switch roles when they address Turkey. France is reluctant to admit Turkey into the EU, whereas the U.S. has sought to cultivate Turkey as an ally, to anchor Turkey to the West and has made it a foreign policy objective to support Turkey’s EU candidacy. (Abramowitz, Morton. The United States and Turkey: Allies in Need. New York: The Century Foundation Press, 2003. at 17).
Paul Wolfowitz, then the American deputy Secretary of Defense, summed up Washington’s approach in 2002 when he said, “Turkey’s aspiration to join the European Union is a development that should be welcomed by all people who share values of freedom and democracy.” (Wolfowitz, Paul. Speech to Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation. Istanbul, Turkey. 14 Jul. 2002. 27 Apr. 2007 ).
Similarly to the Irak-France arms commerce question, one reason why there is a positive diplomatic relationship with Turkey is that the U.S. wants an important military ally in the area, if only for strategic and oil reasons. Turkey is the fifth largest importer of U.S. arms after Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, Israel, and South Korea. (Grimmett, Richard. U.S. Arms Sales: Agreements with and Deliveries to Major Clients, 1997-2004. CRS Report for Congress 29 Dec. 2005, at 10.). In this perpective, no longer focused on the Soviet threat, Ankara and Washington now cooperate in the Middle East, the Caspian Sea, and the Caucasus. This shift has reenergized the partnership and added an important strategic dimension. Moreover, the U.S. became a major investor in the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which began construction in late 2002, facilitating the transportation of Caspian oil and gas to Western markets. (Aydin, Mustafa and Erhan, Cagri. Turkish-American Relations Past, Present, and Future. London: Routledge, 2004, at 93). The pipeline, which carries oil and natural gas from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean, is unique because it bypasses both Russian and Iranian territory, thereby serving American interests and boosting cash flow and prestige for Turkey’s energy sector and American connection. The U.S.’s support for Baku-Ceyhan also stems from “a strong desire to support Turkey as an ally and strategically important country for the U.S. in its bid for a greater economic and political role in Caspian energy development.” (Ibid, 100).
Turkey was also a source of Franco-American tensions during the preparation of the Iraq war in early 2003. France sought to block U.S.-led efforts to send NATO forces to defend Turkey fearing that these forces would fight Iraq. (Gallis, Paul. “France: Factors Shaping Foreign Policy, and Issues in U.S.-French Relations.” CRS Report for Congress 19 May 2006, at 15). By arguing that acceding to such a request would be tantamount to tacit support from all NATO member states for the impending American invasion, Paris attempted to thwart the U.S. initiative. When this argument did not enjoy pan-European support, the French government ultimately agreed that the decision to aid Turkey would be made in a NATO body where Paris was not a member. In late February 2003, NATO decided to provide defensive assistance to Turkey (Gallis, Paul. “France: Factors Shaping Foreign Policy, and Issues in U.S.-French Relations.” CRS Report for Congress 19 May 2006. at 23).
PROBLEMS WITH IRAN
Until recently with President Sarkozy, Paris had failed to take a clear stand on the Iranian nuclear issue, the greatest threat currently facing the region. Despite its recent cooperation with Britain, Germany, and the United States in imposing broad-but-weak economic sanctions on Iran, France clearly maintained strong economic ties with the country. Its exports to Iran doubled to 2 billion Euros in the five years leading up to the Iraq War. (Daragahi, Borzou. “France Steps Up Its Investments in Iran.” New York Times 23 Jun. 2004). “ The French are eager to come to Iran,” said Bernard Hourcade, a Paris-based Iran scholar who acts as a consultant to French companies considering doing business in Iran. “It is the only major place in the Middle East to invest because the other countries are more or less in a revolutionary or pre-revolutionary situation.” (Ibid.) During the 2006 Lebanon War, French Foreign Minister Phillipe Douste-Blazy stated that it was “evident that Iran plays a stabilizing force in the region.” (“Once Again, a Leading Light.” The Economist 3 Aug. 2006). In an interview with Israel’s Haaretz Daily in 2005, President Chirac reiterated that “the prospect of Iran equipping herself with nuclear weapons is unacceptable to France, her partners, and the entire world.” (Embassy of France in Washington. “Interview Given by Jacques Chirac, President of the Republic, to Adar Primor from the Israeli Newspaper ‘Haaretz’ – Excerpts.” Standpoint 133 (22 Jul. 2005). 27 Apr. 2007).
And yet, Chirac had stated that the prospect of Iran “having one or perhaps a second bomb a little later, well, that’s not very dangerous.” (Sciolino, Elaine and Bennhold, Katrin. “Chirac Muses on Iran, then Retreats.” International Herald Tribune 1 Jan. 2007). The French President does not seem overly concerned that Iran’s nuclear ambitions threaten the basic stability of the entire region and could lead to a nuclear genocide.
TENTATIVE CONCLUSION
French efforts to maintain the "Hexagon"'s (another popular name for France) fading influence in the region have largely failed. Three Chirac allies, Saddam Hussein, Hafez al-Assad, and Yasser Arafat have all died. French pro-Arab and cold-Turkey positions clashed with the U.S.'s pro-Israeli and Ankara support. Although President Sarkozy realizes all of this and has modified some of Chirac's policies (like being more pro-Israeli and strict as regards Iran's nuclear program), he still represents France's "national interests", meaning he continues to seek markets for French weapons, nuclear energy and other commodities, resources (oil, as France's nuclear park only covers 80 percent of the Nation's energy needs) and prestige to keep help pay for the bills. As for the U.S. foreign policy in the Mid-East, there is now a consensus in Washington D.C. that there must be a refocus from Iraq (once the IraqiDemocratisation process is better sealed) to the Iranian nuclear challenge and Afghanistan (with Bin Laden still on the loose). In relation to France, there is no question that the United States's and NATO are far more influential in shaping this region and in trying in restore peace and prosperity to this part of the World whose Muslim inhabitants (for the most part) call Machrek (the Eastern Islamic "empire", or "Ummah"). As a result, President Sarkozy may be realistic enough to admit the validity of the adage: "If you can't beat them, join them".
A U.S. ambassador to France who is of the same generation as President Sarkozy and shares his French and legal culture would be effective in communicating to him and Bernard Kouchner, his foreign affairs minister, some of these above mentioned recommendations, provided the U.S foreign policy team agrees.